JOINT BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (JBDA)



The charter of the Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA) Joint Test & Evaluation (JT&E) is to investigate, evaluate, and improve BDA support to the joint force commander in order to facilitate operational decision making. Potential improvements will be identified, prioritized, and coordinated with the appropriate commands.

The JBDA JT&E established a baseline of the joint force BDA process by evaluating and documenting current operations in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and training in Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 2002 (UFL 02). JBDA is in the process of analyzing the data to identify deficiencies and opportunities for DOTMLPF-related improvements. The selected enhancements will be installed and tested in environments as closely aligned with baseline measurements, as possible. JBDA then will analyze the data from the enhanced tests and evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of the proposed enhancements. The U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and the combatant commands are participating in the JBDA JT&E, and the U.S. Army is the lead Service and executive agent.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

At the conclusion *of Desert Storm,* BDA was identified as one of the four major intelligence shortcomings. "The BDA process was difficult especially for re-strike decisions. BDA doctrine and organization must be determined" (Department of Defense [DoD] Final Report to Congress, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, I992).* The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Services and the combatant commands are establishing a BDA structure that will satisfy combatant commanders' requirements." (Department of Defense. *Final Report to Congress o f the Persian Gulf War, April 1992)*

DESERT STORM outstripped intelligence collection and analysis capabilities and sharply reduced BDA effectiveness. This was exacerbated by the lack of trained analysts and by doctrine that specified BDA production responsibilities. Beginning immediately after the war, DoD addressed the BDA problems by reorganizing targeting activities within DIA. DIA created the Deputy Directorate for Targets (Joint Staff (JS)/J2T) as the single national-level point of contact for targeting matters and formed a BDA Working Group under the existing Military Targets Intelligence Committee.

The BDA improvements and changes following *DESERT STORM* have been incorporated—at least in part—in subsequent contingencies and operations. The first operation that included enough targets to effectively exercise BDA was *DESERT FOX.* With its

scripted nature, short duration, and very limited target development *DESERT FOX* was not a vehicle for determining whether or not *DESERT STORM* BDA problems were fixed. For example, while *DESERT STORM* found that there was a critical need to develop a process for maneuver force BDA, *DESERT FOX* emphasized infrastructure and not ground force equipment. CINCCENT stated that he had "seen no seams in the intelligence community in terms of differences of opinion," and that BDA had been rapid, responsive, and well analyzed. BDA worked in *DESERT FOX.* The CINC was satisfied, and it appears that members of the intelligence community worked well together. However, *DESERT FOX* did not answer the question of whether or not *DESERT STORM* BDA problems were fixed; the operations were simply too dissimilar.

The second significant combat operation subsequent to *DESERT STORM* was *ALLIED FORCE.* This was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, running from 24 March through 20 June 1999. Federated BDA was used during *ALLIED FORCE.* The target sets were federated between USEUCOM (the USEUCOM-established Joint Task Force was designated as the BDA authority) and the NMJIC. As in *DESERT FOX,* federated BDA mitigated some of the coordination problems and appeared to increase BDA responsiveness.

Although *ALLIED FORCE* and *DESERT STORM* shared some common characteristics, a major difference in the two operations was scale - i.e., the numbers of strike aircraft, sorties, and bases, and the size of the joint operations area. *DESERT STORM* was larger in almost every category. There was also a vast difference in the BDA focus for the two operations. *DESERT STORM* emphasized ground force targets, while the same targets were fourth on the *ALLIED FORCE* target list. Finally, the tempo of operations was continuous in *DESERT STORM* and intermittent in *ALLIED FORCE.*

DESERT FOX and *ALLIED FORCE* illustrated that advances have been made in BDA since *DESERT STORM*. At the same time, these two operations highlight the need for further improvement. Training of analysts still is problematic. Processes and procedures are in place for conducting BDA on fixed targets, but these processes can and should be enhanced to provide BDA in a more timely and accurate fashion to meet the commander's decision cycle. Finally, there has been little focus or effort on improving mobile target BDA since *DESERT STORM.*

In June 1999, the Deputy Director, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E), under the Director, Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation (DTSE&E), in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), initiatied the Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA) Joint Feasibility Study (JFS) to address these recurring shortcomings. The U.S. Army was designated as the lead Service, and responded quickly to the JT&E Senior Advisory Council's (SAC) guidance, moving the JFS sponsorship to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and assembling the initial staff.

TEST & EVALUATION ACTIVITY

During this past year, the DDT&E approved the JBDA Program Test Plan, and JBDA JT&E collected baseline data in *ENDURING FREEDOM* and *UFL 02.* It also maintained continuity from the Joint Warfighters JT&E, as JWF closed out.

TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

The JBDA JT&E program meets the stated purposes of the OSD JT&E Program and the Services and combatant commands continue to support the project. Resources and planning are on track to support continued testing, data analysis, and development, fielding, and evaluation of BDA-related DOTMLPF enhancements.